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Abstract  
The Turkish social insurance system has been feverishly debated for years, particularly through 
its burden on the economy. The most recent reform is an attempt to neutralize the deterioration 
within the social security system and its effects on the economy. After the recent reform, ‘the way 
that retirement benefits are calculated’ is changed unfavorably for workers and the minimum age 
for retirement is increased. In particular, for an agent with 25 years of social security tax 
payments, the replacement rate is down from 65 percent to 50 percent. On the other hand, 
retirement age is up from 60 to 65. The aim of this paper is to investigate the macroeconomic 
effects of these changes using an OLG model. The author’s findings indicate that labor supply, 
output and capital stock increase when changes above are applied to the benchmark economy 
calibrated to the Turkish economy data in 2005. A critical change with the current reform is that 
the marginal benefit of working has become uniform over ages. In a simulation exercise, the 
marginal retirement benefit in the benchmark economy is changed to be uniform over ages while 
keeping the size of social security system unchanged. As a result, the benefit of retiring at a later 
period increases. However, uniform distribution of the marginal benefits itself decreases both the 
capital stock and output of the economy. Increasing the retirement age has positive effects on the 
economy since agents obtain retirement benefits for fewer years and at an older age. 
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Introduction 
The Turkish social insurance system has been an active area of debates for its generosity and the huge 
deficits in its budget, especially after the 1980s. This is particularly because high public sector deficits have 
so far been one of the main challenges for the fragile Turkish economy. Although a significant portion of 
those public deficit stems from deficits on the other components of the public budget, the social security 
system is another significant source (Sayan and Kiraci, 2001). It should also be stated that the social 
insurance budget deficits are mainly due to two most common issues in developing economies: early 
retirement and unofficial employment (Alper, Imrohoroglu and Sayan, 2004).  
Both the early retirement and the unofficial employment challenges are basically caused by the traditional 
‘no minimum age requirement’ rule and a lower number of payment days of premium to get retired (Akbulak 
and Akbulak, 2004). This negative outlook is supported by the fact that, as was revealed in the OECD-
Economic Outlook statistics, Turkey usually ranks quite high between the OECD countries in accordance 
with individual tax burden. In the US, for example, the payroll taxes currently stand at 12.4% on wages up 
to $113,700 (employer and employee combined). High taxes in Turkey encourage informal economy and 
discourage the economic activity and employment (Özbek, 2006). Social security taxes account for around 
40 percent on average, for instance.  
Meanwhile and according to the IMF calculations, despite all the favorable demographic figures, the total 
amount of social security system deficits amounted to 475 billion TL between 1994 and 2004. This was 
equivalent to 110% of the total GDP of Turkey or 1.5 times the total debt stock, as of the end of 2004. It 
therefore deserves a large part to be blamed for Turkey's fiscal challenges. Naturally, there have been 
several attempts to reform the social security system in the past two decades. Initially, in 1999, the first 
reform was in effect and it actually temporarily decreased the deficit slightly. Later on, in 2006, the three 
separate social security institutions would be theoretically united. The reform process would peak through 
2008. 
In Turkey, transfer payments to the social security institutions from the public budget amounted to 4.5 
percent of GDP per year, as of 2005. This is a heavy burden for the fragile Turkish economy; and causes 
economic instability. Particularly considering almost 85 percent of the population in Turkey has social 
insurance record (Ministry of Labor and Social Security statistics of 2005), severity of the problem gets 
clear. Meanwhile, the ILO (International Labor Organization), the IMF and the MLSS statistics (TUSIAD, 
2004), show that, Turkey is among the most rapidly aging countries because of its current high young 
population ratio and relatively downward trended population growth rates (Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security reform book, 2008). Projections and the related statistics show that along the following 20 years, 
active labor force population is expected to increase (TUSIAD, 2004). Yet, following that period, the 
dependency ratio is expected to rise. Assuming no new reforms on the current pension system, the total 
deficit of the social security institutions is expected to rise to 6% by 2050, and further up to 7% by 2070. 
In order to benefit from this demographic opportunity, Imrohoroglu (2004) suggests that Turkey should 
have a fundamental structural reform to deal with the upcoming shift in the demographic profile. Due to the 
higher economic growths anticipated for the following years, it is suggested that savings and the funds of 
the social insurance institutions should be increased along this period (TUSIAD, 2004). Sayan and Kiraci 
(2001), on the other hand, offer control over deterioration in the dependency ratio; via changes in minimum 
retirement age and another change in the contribution and replacement ratios in order to deal with deficits 
in the pension system. 
Pension systems in most developing economies, including in Turkey, have pay-as-you-go structure 
(PAYG). Workers basically pay the taxes, set by their governments, while they work; and get whatever 
pensions the government decides once they get retired. Most European and some other, relatively social, 
advanced countries are also within this group. In countries such as USA and many other western 
economies, though, the social insurance systems have a defined-benefit (or defined-contribution) setup. In 
this case, the workers are the ones that decide how much to pay while they work; and therefore, they are 
the ones to decide how much they would want to get paid after the retirement. There is also an important 
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state-pension system vs. the private plans or the occupational-retirement plans distinction to be analyzed. 
Yet we skip all these distinctions, as all of these classifications are beyond our scope here.  
Despite the Eldred`s (Eldred, 1981) well-known definition of the social security systems as overcharging 
some while undercharging some others to have the 'social adequacy' (while having its budget balances in 
equilibrium); the famously generous Turkish social security system has almost always overcharged the 
majority of its participants. Meanwhile, the replacement ratio in the Turkish public insurance system is quite 
high compared to its European and other developed or developing counterparts. Currently, the replacement 
ratio is 2.6 percent on average for the first 25 years (Articles 506, 5434, 1479 and 5510 of the related 
institutions). The world average, however, is 1.5 percent per year. The replacement ratio in aggregate may 
be over 100 percent in Turkey while its OECD counterparts` average is just 68.7 percent (OECD country 
statistics). 
Another huge issue with the Turkish social security system (as opposed to its world counterparts) was the 
deteriorating dependency rate. On average a social insurance system should have 4 participants for each 
retiree, the world average for the dependency ratio. Turkey, on the other hand, has 1.9 participants for 
each retiree (MLSS reform book, 2008). Sayan and Kiraci (2001) also point to the increasing dependency 
ratio (ratio of retirees to workers, which again gets worse as it goes up) as the sign of potentially serious 
future financial difficulties in the pension systems. 
There are two basic ways to cope with problems related to the social insurance systems. You would either 
increase the tax collections or a decrease in the retirement benefits (by lowering the replacement rate for 
instance, for instance). The most recent Turkish reform decreases the retirement benefits by changing the 
benefits calculation formula. For instance, formerly, there was a 65 percent replacement rate for 25 years 
of contribution payments, whereas the new act requires a 50 percent pension payment for the same period. 
Also, the marginal retirement benefit was gradually decreasing by years in the labor force, previously.  
Benefits calculation in the benchmark economy was sum of a ‘3.5’ percent per every year of the first ten 
years, another ‘2’ percent per each year of the following fifteen years and finally ‘1.5’ percent per each year 
thereafter. The reform economy, on the other hand, requires a uniform contribution to the replacement ratio 
per each year of work. Marginal retirement benefit becomes uniform over ages. Reform also increases 
minimum age for retirement benefit collections. Minimum retirement age is increased from 60 to 65. 
This paper employs a dynamic setup of Overlapping Generations (OLG) model to examine the 
macroeconomic effects of the two major changes by the recent, extensive social insurance reform. The 
author develops a partial equilibrium life-cycle model. This model mostly follows the model used in Huggett 
and Ventura (1997). Agents start out as workers and they are allowed to make labor supply and saving 
decisions. After being entitled to the retirement benefits (corresponding to a minimum 25 years of work), 
workers face utility costs if their labor supply is still positive. Agents' labor-leisure decisions after this period 
depend on the utility cost they face; and labor productivity of these agents changes deterministically by 
age. 
The author evaluates four alternative economies in this paper. The main reforms implemented and the 
results of the paper are as follows. The first reform deals with just the formula change for the benefit 
payments calculation. Replacement rate for the same years of experience is down, and overall this 
modification decreases the social security expenditures from the government’s perspective. Agents, on the 
other hand, work for more periods to compensate for this decrease in the periodical contributions to the 
replacement ratio. Decreasing the marginal benefits for retirement, for the first 10 years from ‘3.5’ percent 
to ‘2’ percent, and promoting staying in the labor force even after getting entitlements for retirement 
benefits; has positive effect on the labor supply, output and capital stock of the economy. Output and 
capital stocks increase by 12 percent and 15 percent respectively. Hours at work and the average 
retirement ages per agent do not show any significant changes, however. Social security tax, J , in the 
reform economy with replacement rate changes is down to ‘15.2’ percent on average.  
Then, the marginal benefits of retirement (per each year of experience) are changed, by changing its 
distribution only. That is, the replacement rate formula is changed, while the size of the social security 
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system is kept constant. Changing just the distribution of the replacement rate and decreasing the 
contribution of each of the first 8 periods (corresponds to the age of 60), increases tendency to work. Thus, 
decreases the dependency ratio and increases payment inflows into the social security system. Changing 
the distribution of the replacement rate has negative effect on the economic activity of the model economy. 
Both the output and the capital stock are down by ‘3.75’ and ‘5.6’ percent respectively. This outcome, 
briefly, means that savings are decreased, but labor supply is increased (by more years at work). Decrease 
in the economic activity is because of the dominance of savings fall over the labor supply increase. 
The third reform is the case where minimum age for collection of the retirement benefits is increased to 65. 
Increasing the minimum age for the retirement benefits promotes more days in the labor force and 
encourages more social security premium payments. Meanwhile, agents get retirement benefits for less 
time, after the retirement. Age increase for the retirement benefits collection, as shown in the reforms 
section, seems to be more effective than the basic replacement rate change in the previous reforms. 
Implementing both the “age rise” and “changing the benefits calculations formula” modifications together, in 
the last reform economy, reflects the combined aggregate effects of both of the changes to the model 
economy. The last alternative economy shows substantial changes both in the capital stock and the output 
of the economy. This is primarily because increasing minimum age for benefit payments is more effective 
and dominates the moderate effects of change in calculation of benefit payments. The model provides a 
new rate in equilibrium, as an outcome of the new social security system. In a way, the social security 
reform encourages more time in the labor force and therefore more tax payments to the system. And this 
will, in return, help decrease the social security taxes. Social security taxes in reform economy with both 
the age and benefit formula reforms applied, decreases to around 13 percent. 
Literature Review 
The macroeconomic effects of a social security reform are not a common area of focus in the literature over 
social insurance, especially in the developing countries (Glomm, 2006). Ferreira studies social security 
reforms in the Brazilian economy (Ferreira, 2004 and Ferreira, 2005), and reveals useful information 
regarding the contributions of the reforms for the economic recovery of Brazil as a developing country. 
Glomm (2005 and 2006) on the other hand, concentrates on the large-scale implications of the generous 
public sector pensions in Brazil. Glomm`s findings regarding early retirement effects (of the generous public 
sector pension systems) are an essential step towards the efficacy of social security reform analysis for any 
other developing country. The researcher benefits from these two lines of research to better capture the 
macroeconomic implications of the reforms. 
In the developed economies, though, the macroeconomics effect of social security reforms is an expanded 
area of study. Elder and Holland (2002) study macroeconomic effects of social security on interest rate, 
through investment of social security funds to the bonds or equities market. They examine the effect of the 
size and the portfolio distribution of the social security funds over the interest rates; and model the 
relationship between the two. Their findings indicate that as the size of the US Social Security Trust Funds 
or the portfolio share of bonds or equities in those funds increase, interest rate over that investment is 
decreased (Elder and Holland, 2002). Yet, the financial market implications and the portfolio flow effects 
are also beyond the researcher’s focus, as this paper just concentrate on the real macro implications in 
developing economies. 
As for modeling, the researcher benefits from a large literature of modeling the structure of the reel 
economy. Kydland and Prescott`s revolutionary 1982 paper, time to build and aggregate fluctuations, is a 
classic reference to get a better understanding of reel economy effects of a random policy shock, including 
in OLG model setups. The author benefits from their analysis of the reel economy effects of an external 
shock. Meanwhile, Auerbach and Kotlikoff`s 1987 book "Dynamic Fiscal Policy" is a reference book in 
studies over fiscal policy analysis, in particular for those in an overlapping generations context. The 
discussion in this paper also links up very well with the literature by Sayan and Kiraci (2001), Huggett and 
Ventura (1997) and Kaygusuz (2015) in its modeling of the social security system in Turkey. The author 
builds his OLG model setup following the literature in that line. 
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As part of a study for TUSIAD, Imrohoroglu (2004) compares the Turkish social insurance system with its 
other OECD countries counterparts and introduces a general equilibrium model for the Turkish social 
insurance system (Alper, Imrohoroglu, and Sayan, 2004). According to that paper, the current distributive 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) setup of the social security system deters savings as well as decreasing the labor 
supply and employment. It, thus, reduces the real wages and GDP of a country, as it is in Turkey. Alper, 
Imrohoroglu and Sayan (2004), together, present a comprehensive model for the Turkish Social insurance 
system reform. They, in particular, point to the potential financial distresses and dangers of aging in 
population of Turkey. 
Sayan and Kiraci (2001), on the other hand, study an alternative pension reform with higher retirement age 
and a few other slight changes in the contribution and replacement rates to the PAYG system in Turkey. 
They mainly follow the age requirement arrangement in 2000. They focus on the public pension system 
deficits and propose options to the on-going PAYG system to decrease those deficits. Their model is 
illustrative in many senses to give an idea about the context of the necessary reforms to the ongoing social 
insurance system. 
Finally, it should also be noted again that, early retirement is, indeed, not just a huge problem in developing 
countries; developed economies face similar structural issues. For instance, Canada`s social security 
system, with its income security structure, disables working in older ages. And, therefore, early retirement 
is still an important issue there. Beker, Gruber and Milligan (2003) study the impacts of social security 
structure on the retirement behavior of participants in Canada. They suggest control over lifetime earnings 
that they believe has significant incentives for retirement in early ages. Gruber also demonstrates the early 
retirement incentives of the social security system (Gruber, 1999). Haveman, Holden, Wilson and Wolfe 
(2003) focus on the effects of early retirement on the economic well being of retired-workers. They find 
strong links between accepting early-retirement benefits and poverty in older ages. This punishment, if you 
want to call it, is directly related to the early retirement issues in another advanced economy, the U.S. Yet, 
the Turkish case with decreasing the replacement rates and initiation of more years in the labor force is 
also, in a way, a similar punishment for early retirement in its nature. 
The paper will continue as follows: The next section discusses the model, which includes the household`s 
problem, firms` problem, modeling of the social security system and the definition of equilibrium. Calibration 
to the Turkish economy data follows in section 3. Then the reforms are applied to the benchmark model; 
and in section 5 results are revealed and findings are examined. Finally, the conclusion section 
summarizes the paper, its findings and fulfills the study. 
Model and Methodology 
This paper deals with the structural problems of a developing economy. In particular, it analyzes the 
famously deficient (with huge budget deficits) social security system of the fragile Turkish economy. It 
analyzes the related main issues prior to the 2008 social security reform and impacts of the recently 
implemented reforms. The paper discusses the pros and cons of a reform applied to deal with the huge 
public deficits, argued to be mainly due to the social insurance deficits. The author creates a model 
economy with agents that differ in their asset holdings, ages, past mean earnings, utility costs, and their 
experience in the labor force. The setup is developed within a partial equilibrium life-cycle model. This 
model follows a broad literature discussed in Huggett and Ventura (1997).1 
Given particular preferences, a production technology and fixed endowments; the researcher applies a 
social security reform and then observe the macroeconomic effects (in particular the output, labor supply 
and the capital stock movements) the reforms result in. The social security reform rearranges the minimum 
age for retirement benefits and changes calculation of the replacement rate for the retirement benefits. And 
through that variation, the aggregate effects over the model economy are evaluated by the steady-state 
comparison of the two cases. 
                                                             
1 Some other important overlapping generations models to model the social security are Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, 
Joines (1995); Rios and Rull (1996), Hubbard and Judd (1987), Cooley and soares (1995, 1996), Conesa and Krueger 
(1998), Imrohoroglu (1998), Rust and Phelan (1997), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1997) ). 
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The paper has a dynamic model of overlapping generations (OLG) economy. The economy is populated by 
a continuum of male agents (representing their families) with the total measure of one. Agents live through 
periods 1 to T where each period corresponds to a five-year interval and the total population equals to one 
in each period. Every period a new generation (cohort) is born. Each cohort`s share in population 	
h
j  is 
calculated by the following formula:  
 	
h
j
= 1- I j( )r j( )
h
j
-1
1+n
,and h
j
=1
j
å
 
Where the indicator function ‘I (j)’ is follows, 
 	
I j( )= 0 if j £8
1 if 8   j £T
ì
í
î  
Here, “j = 8”, is the period corresponding to the age of ‘60’; when agents begin to face the mortality risk and 
'j' is the age of an agent at a specific date. 
There is a separate fixed-age ‘J’ that shows when the agents start to become entitled to retirement and its 
benefits, but they have to wait until the age of 'R' to get the retirement benefits. Agents retire at the age of 
'R' for sure (they are enforced to). Retirees get the retirement payments after the age of 60 (= period 8); 
and it continues until the final age of 'T', as long as they survive. Agents also face a mortality risk after the 
age of 60 (r ). Asset holdings, left from people died, are uniformly distributed to the living agents. This is 
represented as and is called the ‘transfer payments’ from government, ‘TR’ in the model.  
Every period a new generation is born and the population grows at a rate of 'n'. Also, each period any 
agent is given 1 unit of labor endowment. Agents devote 'l' proportion of this labor to work and keep the 
remaining proportion as leisure (1-l), since they get utility from both the consumption and the leisure. 
Agents also have distinct productivity levels (z) by their ages. The productivity levels determine the labor 
income agent get and changes by age. 
 	
z
j
ÎZ = z
1
,z
2
,...,z
R( ) 
Agents get their labor income from the labor supply equal to 	
z
j
lw
. Where 'w' is the real wage. There is 
also a consumption tax ‘	t
c
’ and social security tax ‘J ’, as well as some other income tax ‘t ’ over the total 
income from the labor supply and the assets held (a). Asset holdings will provide an interest payment at the 
real rate of 'r'. 
Utility function of the agents at any period is given below. The utility function that the author uses here is a 
common labor-leisure decision utility function, consistent with stylized facts. All agents are identical in their 
preferences and hence have the following identical utility function. 
 	
U
j
c ,1- l( )= log c( )-s1
l1+s 2
1+s
2
- m l , j( )p j- Jq J
 
For some, 
 	
m l , j( )= 1 if l   0and j   J
0 if otherwise
ì
í
î  
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Each agent has (or chooses) some utility cost as he is born. They draw it at their birth, but have to wait till 
they start to deserve retirement, to observe it. After age J, agents face this idiosyncratic utility cost (q); and 
it affect the entire process of the agent`s decision regarding their working attitudes looking forward. 
The utility cost, drawn at the birth, is derived from an exponential distribution, where 	q is calibrated and, ‘q’ 
changes by the age. The exponential function for the utility costs’ distribution is as follows: 
                                                        	
f q( )= 1
q
e
-
q
q
 
And the utility cost varies over time as, 
                                                        	
q
t
=p j- Jq
J  
And, again, it is observed for the periods, 	 t   J . 
This utility cost idea briefly means that: Some agents might prefer not to work after they face a high utility 
cost; and instead wait for their retirement benefit payments, while some others may prefer to keep working 
until the age of R, all depending on the utility costs they face. 
Pension Earnings 
Retirees get a benefit payment 	
b e( )
 after the age of ‘R’; if they have completed their social security 
payments and are entitled to retirement. 	e  in this formula, is the average past mean labor income of an 
agent or worker. The retirement benefit payment will be a function of this weighted average past mean 
income, along with another coefficient for the replacement. 
The former social security system required the following benefit payments calculation (with 'j' being the age 
and 'i' the number of years worked - experience): 
 	
b e,h( )=
y
1
h( )e if h£ i1
y
1
i
1
+y
2
h- i
1( )( )e if i1   h£ i2
y
1
i
1
+y
2
i
2
- i
1( )+y 3 h- i2( )( )e if h  i2
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
 
Where, 	e  is again the average past labor income, ‘h’ is years of experience;  	
i
1
=10
,  	
i
2
=25
, and  
y
1 , 
 
y
2 ,  
y
3 , are the marginal retirement benefits corresponding to ‘3.5’, ‘2’ and ‘1.5’ percent each, 
respectively. 
Post the reform, the new social security system, has the following simpler and relatively uniform benefit 
formula: 
                                  	
b e,h( )= g h( )e , if h  0{
 
Where, 	e  is again the average past labor income, and g  is the ‘2’ percent marginal retirement benefit 
added to the replacement rate per years of work experience. 
The new social security system, as is clear from the benefit formula above, have redistributed and 
decreased the replacement rate (the benefit payment coefficients) in order to encourage workers to remain 
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in the labor force and pay more social security taxes. Although not formulated here, it brings forth an age 
increase as well. 
The Households' Problem 
Households differ in their ages (j), productivity levels (dependent on the age and the experience), 	
z
j ; 
average past mean earnings 	e , an idiosyncratic utility costs 	
q
j  and asset holdings ‘a’. Each period, 
agents observe their assets ‘a’, number of periods worked ‘i’ and past mean earnings (	e ) and given their 
utility costs 	
q
j  they face between ages J and R, then they decide whether to work more or have more 
leisure. 
Households at period 1 (the starting age corresponding to the age of 20) have zero asset holding and zero 
initial wealth. The model have the state variables “a, j, 	e , q, I”; and the control variables “a and l”. Then the 
Bellman equation for household`s problem is as follows, 
 	
V a, j ,e,q,h( )=maxa'³0,lU c ,1- l( )+b 1- I j( )r j+1( )V a', j +1,e',q,h'( )  
Subject to, 
 	
1+t c( )c+a'= z jlw-J z jlw( )-t z jlw + ra( )+ I j( )b e,h( )+TR 
Recalling that I (j) was as follows, 
                                         	
I j( )= 0 if j £ R
1 if R   j £T
ì
í
î  
And, 
			 	
h=0, if R  j £T
hÎ 0,1éë ùû , if j £ R  
Since 'i' is the sum of years worked until the age of 'j'; and then, the average past mean labor income at 
time 'j+1' is as follows, 
 	
e'=
eh+ z
j
lw
h'
if j   R
e if j ³R
ì
í
ï
î
ï
 
And, 
 	
h'=
h+1, if l   0
h, if l =0
ì
í
î  
Where, 
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q'=pq
j
l =0, if R   j   T
lÎ 0,1éë ùû , if j £ R  
The Firm`s Problem 
The model has a constant return to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas form production function and a firm to 
represent the supply side in this economy. The production function is a standard supply-side assumption in 
recent publications over an economic analysis of a policy change. The list includes almost all advanced or 
developing economies, including those over the Turkish economy. It better capture the dynamics of 
response of output to capital stock and labor supply changes. ‘K’, in this formula, represents the aggregate 
capital stock and ‘L’ is the aggregate labor supply. 
The production function, then, is as follows: 
 	
Y = F K ,L( )= AKaL1-a
 
Where ‘A’ will be normalized to 1. a  is a constant between (0,1), and should be read as the capital share 
of output. d  is also between (0,1) and will be the capital depreciation rate for the economy. Firms 
maximize their profit according to the following profit maximization equation: 
 	
max
K ,L
F K ,L( )-wL- rK
 
For some given (w, r) couple. 
Calibration of the Model Economy 
This section presents calibration of the model economy to the data from the Turkish economy and the 
process for selection of the parameter values for the model economy. Simulation of the economy is 
examined through selection of the values of the demographic structure, the production function and the 
preference parameters to match the Turkish economy. It then parameterizes the social security system to 
better capture the quantitative implications of each of the reforms implemented over the economy. A brief 
summary of parameter values is provided on table 3. 
The Demographics 
Considering the reform was applied in early 2008; the model economy has got to represent an earlier 
period Turkish economy, to better represent the benchmark economy. In that regard, the model economy is 
calibrated to the Turkish economy data in 2005, as one of the good example of a transition periods. Each 
period in the model economy corresponds to 5 years. And, each agent lives for a total of 13 periods at 
most, through periods 1 to T. Agents are born and economically active at the age of 20 (the start-up point). 
They are active through ages 20 to 85; and die for sure at the age of 85 (T = 85), where “	
r
T =1”. Each 
agent is able to work through the ages 20 to 60 (R = 60 in the benchmark economy). Thus, they are 
economically active at the age of 20 and cannot work after the age of 60 (strictly enforced). At the age of “J 
= 45”, each agent with 5 periods of experience, 'i', is able to get entitled to the retirement benefits. All of the 
demographic variables are set for a period of 5 years. 
The population growth rate 'n' is set equal to the average growth rate in Turkey between 1985 and 2005 
(data from the Turkish Statistical Institute, TUIK) which equals 1.8 percent. Mortality rate after the age of 60 
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is set so that the fraction of population over 60 to the population over 20 equals ‘14.9’ percent (r = 
0.233).2 
Productivity 
Considering all of the agents between 20 and 60 (and 65, for the reform economy), the market productivity 
levels should also be determined, as they are also needed to model the production side of the economy. 
Productivity levels change by age (as seen in Table 1). Mean hourly wages are calculated as in Kaygusuz 
(2015). Productivity level (	
z
j ) and its distribution is derived from household`s labor force data of the 
Turkish economy, using the household labor force database from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). 
Weekly working hours and wages from 1985 to 2005, for each group of agents, are derived from the official 
database. Then, hourly wages are evaluated over that data; where mean hourly wage is 3.2274.3 
Table 1: Productivity by Age 
Age 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Productivity 
 
0.570 
0.808 
1.012 
1.129 
1.201 
1.232 
1.134 
0.858 
0.697 
 
Production Technology 
Recalling our production function, again: 
                           	
Y = F K ,L( )= AKaL1-a
 
The production side parameters for the Turkish economy mostly follow the work by Imrohoroglu (as part of 
Alper, Imrohoroglu and Sayan, 2004). Here, the technology level, ‘A’, is normalized to 1, as was mentioned 
earlier. ‘a ’, the capital share of output, is set to be ‘0.35’. And, the depreciation rate, ‘d ’, is set equal to 
0.055. 
Preferences 
The utility function, representing the preferences of the agents, is given as follows: 
                                	
U
j
c ,1- l( )= log c( )-s1
l1+s 2
1+s
2
- m l , j( )p j- Jq J
 
Regarding these preferences, the paper has the discount factor parameter ‘b ’ to be calibrate, which is 
used to evaluate the steady state capital to output ratio to be consistent with the value in the data. Capital 
                                                             
2 This statistics is driven from the data from the Turkish Social Insurance Institute (SII) statistics and the Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TUIK). 
3 Hourly wage is simply, wages divided by 4 (weekly payments) and then divided by working hours per week. Mean 
hourly wage will be the average hourly wage for those working over 30 hours a week, which is of the full-time workers. 
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output ratio is 2.73, which is calculated from the data at the State Planning Organization (DPT).  
s
2  is the 
inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply and is set to be 0.5; as it is in its large literature estimates by 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and MaCurdy (1981). Imrohoroglu (2004), on the other hand, uses a 
capital/output ratio equal to ‘2.52’. This is, indeed, quite close to our estimates over the data from the 
Turkish State Planning Organization (DPT). Also, the model has a  
s
1  (the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion) that will also be calibrated to match the hours per week data. 
The overall calibration of the model economy takes place in accordance with the following target (on Table 
2) values for the benchmark economy: 
 Table 2: Benchmark table for model calibration 
Targets Values 
K/Y 
Hours 
Average Retirement 
2.73 per year 
52.1 per week 
55 years 
 
The Utility cost 
Labor force participation of agents between the ages of ‘J=45’ and ‘R=60’ depends upon the distribution of 
the level of some utility cost (q) agents face, depending on  	
f q, j( )
. This utility cost might be the utility 
agents get from resting at home, instead of working or even sometimes the benefit participants would get 
from informal employment, as is common in many developing countries where people keep working without 
any social insurance record. This would, indeed, be beneficial both to the employer and to the employee.  
Agents randomly pick their utility costs when they are born, but face this utility cost at the age of ‘J’ when 
they need to decide whether to work or not. Utility costs are idiosyncratic and also change by the age, once 
they occur. Utility cost is from the following exponential distribution function, where 	q  will be calibrated 
and,                      
                                             	
f q( )= 1
q
e
-
q
q
 
Then the distribution of the utility cost, over time, is as follows: 
                                             	
q
t
=p j- Jq
J  
Again, given that j>J. 
Here, ‘p ’ is calibrated from the model economy; such that, together with the mean utility cost 	q , they 
should match half of agents that continue working after the age of 45 (period 5), and retire by the age of 55. 
“J = 45”, in a way, is the minimum age participants get entitled to the retirement benefits (though they still 
have to wait till the age of 60 to start collecting it) and ‘j’ is the age of the agent at any specific period. Mean 
utility cost 	q  will also be calibrated. 
The Social Security System 
The social security system should be in balance at all periods. Income of the social security system is from 
the social security taxes ‘J ’; and payments to the pensioners are in accordance with the replacement rate 
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and the past mean earnings, ‘	e ’. In this model, the researcher uses the given replacement rate formula 
and decides the social insurance tax rate that balances the social security budget. Benefit functions are 
given for both the benchmark and the reform economies and the researcher then analyzes the equilibrium 
values of the social security taxes that adjust, to have the budget balanced. 
The benchmark economy replacement rate calculation is as follows: 
                                      	
b e,h( )=
y
1
h( )e if h£ i1
y
1
i
1
+y
2
h- i
1( )( )e if i1   h£ i2
y
1
i
1
+y
2
i
2
- i
1( )+y 3 h- i2( )( )e if h  i2
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
 
The Reform economy benefits calculation formula, on the other hand, is as follows: 
                                      	
b e,h( )= g h( )e , if h  0{
 
Where, past mean earnings (	e ) and experience (h) of agents change as follows: 
                               	
e'=
eh+ z
j
lw
h'
if j   R
e if j ³R
ì
í
ï
î
ï
 
Where, 
                            	
h'=
h+1, if l   0
h, if l =0
ì
í
î  
Regarding the benchmark social insurance system`s replacement rate, the model have  
y
1 ,  
y
2  and  
y
3  
that equals ‘0.035’, ‘0.02’ and ‘0.015’ per years of experience, respectively. Reform in the social insurance 
system changes the distribution of the marginal retirement benefits. Marginal benefits, g , are ‘0.02’ for 
each year of social security payments after the reform; which, actually, corresponds to 10 percent per each 
period, for all periods forward.  
The premium ratio is 40 percent on average in Turkey. However, workers make approximately 17 percent 
of these payments. The exact amount changes by the social security institution, and varies from ‘15’ to ‘19’ 
percent. The maximum taxable labor income, on the other hand ( 	
E
max
Income
) is 3.802,50 TL in Turkey; 
which is six times the wage floor in 2006. In the US, on the other hand, the payroll taxes (employer and 
employee combined) currently stand at 12.4 %, on wages up to $113,700. 
Interest rates 
The author uses the capital/GDP ratio from the DPT statistics to decide the interest rate, r; which is simply 
derived from first order conditions of the production function with respect to the capital stock and the labor 
supply. 
Income and consumption taxes 
There are two additional taxes, apart from the social security tax: namely, the income tax, t , and the 
consumption tax, 	t
c
. Income tax is paid over the labor income plus the interest income; while consumption 
tax is proportional to the total consumption at each period. The income tax (t ) equals ‘6.6’ percent on 
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average (from the statistics of the Ministry of Finance, 2005). Income tax is derived via the following 
formula: 
	
IncomeTax =
TotalIncomeTax Paid
Total Income Labor Income+ Interest Income( )  
Consumption tax, 	t
c
, on the other hand is ‘13.6’ percent, on average, again from statistics of Ministry of 
Finance in 2005. 
                             Table 3: Parameter values of the model economy 
Parameters Values 
ߙ 
ߜ 
ߚ 
ݎ 
݊ 
ߩ 
߬ 
߬௖  
K/Y 
Π 
ݍത 
ߪଵ 
ଵ
ఙమ
 
0.35 
0.055 
0.952 
0.073 
0.093 
0.233 
0.066 
0.136 
0.546 
1.15 
0.65 
10 
0.5 
Reforms   
This section studies all of the reforms one by one and their corresponding macroeconomic implications; 
that is the individual changes and the effects of all of these changes. The author examines ‘4’ alternative 
economies where each economy reflects a different change by reform. This is to get a clear and better 
understanding of the individual effects of each of these changes. There are basically two types of variations 
by the reform: the minimum age increase and then the replacement rate formula reform. First, each of the 
changes is applied independently and then, all the variations are applied together to see the aggregate 
collective effect over the model economy. At the final step of each of the reform economy, the benchmark 
economy variables are compared to the reform economy values, and the results from the two outcomes are 
interpreted. 
The changes applied in four different scenarios to the social security system are as follows. First of all, 
calculation of the benefit payments is changed. This is done in such a way that; the size of the social 
security system is also affected. Then, just the distribution of the marginal benefit of retirements is 
changed. Size of the social security system is kept constant in the second case. The third alternative 
scenario is the case where only the age increase is applied. And finally, at the fourth scenario, the author 
examines the combined effect of both replacement rate formula change and the minimum age increase.  
Reform 1: Changing the Replacement Rate Formula 
The author initially focuses on the alternative economy where only calculation of the benefit payments is 
changed. Therefore, at its core, the workers or agents of the economy just get fewer benefits payments for 
the same years of experiences. At this first reform economy, the social security system includes the 
existing minimum age of ‘60’ for calculation of retirement benefit payments; and the marginal benefit of 
retirement is changed to ‘2’ percent for each years of work experience. 
The Replacement rate formula for the benchmark economy is as follows. 
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b e ,h( )=
3.5xh( )e if h£10
3.5x10+2x h-10( )( )e if 10  h£25
3.5x10+2x15+1.5x h-25( )( )e if h  25
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
 
Where, 	e  is the average past mean labor income, and ‘h’ is years of experience. The new social security 
system, however, has the following benefit formula: 
                            	
b e ,h( )= 2xh( )e , if h  0{
 
Where 	eagain the average past mean labor income and ‘2’ is is the marginal retirement benefit added to 
the replacement rate, per each years of experience. 
The first reform economy demonstrates a lower replacement rate on average and the participants` benefits 
from the retirement payments are paid for less time (at the retirement) as the reform encourages staying in 
the labor force. Meanwhile, the social security tax, J , is also decreased. This basically means the size of 
the social security system will go down in aggregate. That, in return, could mean more payments by the 
central government to cover the deficits of the social security system. 
Social security tax in the benchmark economy is on average “J = 0.1735” or ‘17.35’ percent. On the other 
hand, following the first reform, the new reform economy's social security taxes decrease to “J = 0.1520” 
or ‘15.20’ percent. Decrease in the size of the social security system, decreases total social security tax 
payments and minimizes the size of social security system. The other costs follow later on. 
        Table 4: Output table for reform 1 
Variable Percent Change 
Output 
Capital 
Hours 
Retirement 
12.05 
15.38 
0.1 
2 
 
Applying the first reform to the economy, and changing calculation of the replacement rate of the social 
security system has substantial effects on the output of the model economy. Output increases by 12 
percent approximately, as people are encouraged to save and increase the capital stock more and more. 
Capital stock of the model economy has an even larger response to the first reform: it increases by ‘15.38’ 
percent. However, the average retirement age in the economy and hours in the labor force do not show 
substantial changes surprisingly. Hours of work per agent, in a week, remain almost the same. 
Reform 2: Changing the Distribution of the Marginal Benefits 
Secondly, the author studies an alternative economy where the social security tax payment ‘J ’ and 
therefore the size of social security system is not changed. The researcher focuses only on the change in 
the distribution of the marginal benefits of retirement. That is, agents pay the same taxes, but for more 
time; and of course, do not benefit from the reform while working. On the other hand, the replacement rate 
is rising by a constant coefficient of ‘2’ percent for each years of social security payments (years of 
experience) after the reform. 
The post-reform social security system has the following all-new benefit formula this time: 
                               	
b e,h( )= 2.33xh( )e , if h  0{
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Where 	e the average past mean labor income and ‘2.33’ is is the adjusted marginal retirement benefit 
added to the replacement rate per years of work. This new change in the benefits formula corresponds to a 
‘16.36’ percent increase in the marginal benefit of retirement. It should be noted that, in this new reform, the 
researcher just investigates the effect of changing only the distribution of the marginal benefits of 
retirement. 
The social security tax payment, J , is naturally not changed. J  is kept constant at its value in the 
benchmark economy, “J = 0.1735”. To get this outcome for the model economy, the model economy 
needs a coefficient for the replacement rate equal to ‘1.1636’, which basically means the marginal utility 
from retirement should be increased by ‘16.36’ percent per each year of experience. 
The following table (Table 5) illustrates a summary of the results of the second reform economy, 
          Table 5: Output table for reform 2 
Variables Percent Change 
Output 
Capital 
Hours 
Retirement 
-3.75 
-5.6 
-0.24 
1.36 
 
As is clear from the table, the output of the reform economy is decreased surprisingly, in this case. Hours in 
the labor force and the retirement ages are not varied too much (indeed, decreased as the workers are 
negatively affected). The capital stock level, in contrast to the preceding reform, is also decreasing slightly. 
All in all, changing the distribution of the marginal benefit of retirement for each year (while all other 
parameters are kept constant) is proven to be adversely affecting the economic activity. This could be 
explained by decreasing marginal benefits at early years of experience; and increasing benefit of 
retirement, which in turn results in agents saving less and hence producing less.  
Reform 3: Applying the Minimum Age Increase 
In most discussions related to the problems of the social security systems, early retirement and the 
minimum age requirement for retirement are usually two of the key issues brought up. This is in particular 
true for the Turkish economy. In that regard, the third alternative economy is considered as the case where 
only the age increase is applied to the model economy. The replacement rate formula and the distribution 
of the marginal benefits of retirement are both kept the same as in the benchmark economy. 
                              	
b e ,h( )=
3.5xh( )e if h£10
3.5x10+2x h-10( )( )e if 10  h£25
3.5x10+2x15+1.5x h-25( )( )e if h  25
ì
í
ï
ï
î
ï
ï
 
The minimum age for retirement benefits collection is increased from ‘60’ to ‘65’. In a way, people are 
forced to stay in the labor force for longer periods. Below, the author discusses key macroeconomic 
outcomes of the reform implemented on the model economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Bagis / International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science,  
Vol 6 No 1, 2017 ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
 
Pa
ge
16
 
Here, on table 6, is a summary of the basic output table of the new reform economy. 
           Table 6: Output table for reform 3 
Variables Percent Change 
Output 
Capital 
Hours 
Retirement 
27.7 
42.2 
0.6 
3 
 
As is clear from the table above, increasing the minimum age requirement for benefit collections has more 
significant impact than just a change in the marginal benefits collection formula. For instance, output 
increases by a significant ‘27.7’ percent when a basic minimum age requirement for the retirement benefits 
collections is increased to ‘65’. Capital stock increase is even greater, compared to the output's response. 
The aggregate capital stock increases by ‘42.2’ percent. Hours of work per week and the average 
retirement age, however, are slightly changed. It would not be wrong to come up with a conclusion that 
even without changing hours at work, it is possible to have substantial improvement in the aggregate 
economic activity, by just enforcing more years in labor force.  
The social security tax payment, J , is dropped to ‘14.14’, in this case; since agents are working for more 
time and get retirement benefits for fewer years at their retirement. The size of the social security system; 
and therefore, the social security tax payments are decreased as a result. 
Reform 4: Implementing Both of the Reforms Together 
The final alternative economy examines the collective aggregate effect of both the replacement rate 
formula change and the minimum age for retirement increase. The author combines all the reforms and 
tries to get the cumulative effects of all the individual reforms applied simultaneously. Post the reform; the 
final reform economy has the following benefit formula. 
                             	
b e ,h( )= 2xh( )e , if h  0{
 
Here, ‘	e ’ is again the average past mean labor income; ‘2’ represents the marginal retirement benefits 
added to the replacement rate, per years of work experience. And, as in the last reform, the minimum age 
for retirement benefits collection is increased from ‘60’ to ‘65’. 
This final reform economy has the following output table, table 7, when both of the reforms are 
implemented together. 
             Table 7: Output table for reform 4 
Variables Percent Change 
Output 
Capital 
Hours 
Retirement 
32.4 
50.2 
0.3 
4.5 
 
The table above shows the cumulative outcomes of both of the two key reforms. Changing only the 
minimum age for retirement benefits entitlement was shown to have considerable positive effect on the 
economic activity, in the model economy above (in scenario 3). Applying both of the reforms together, to 
the model economy, is analogous in many respects to the age requirement increase, but of course more 
influential in again many aspects. 
Output increases by ‘32’ percent overall (as opposed to a 28% rise in scenario 3 and a 4% fall in scenario 
2) and the capital stock of the economy is increased by a considerable 50 percent, with an almost half 
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impact. It should be noted that in scenario 3 (with just an age increase), the impact was a significant 42% 
increase, while that in scenario 2 was a modest 6% fall. Hours spent at work, in aggregate, seem not to be 
changing at all while the average retirement age is increasing by a mild 4.5%. The aggregate economic 
activity is shown to change with an even greater response, when both the age and the replacement rate 
modifications of the reform are implemented together. 
The Results 
The first reform was the one that the formula for benefit payments calculation was changed. Replacement 
rate for the same years of experience is down, overall; and this modification, at its core, decreases the 
social security expenditures. Agents, on the other hand, work for more periods to compensate for this 
decrease in the periodical contributions. Decreasing the marginal benefits for retirement, to the 
replacement rate, for the first 10 years (from 3.5 percent to 2 percent), and promoting staying longer in the 
labor force (even after getting entitlement for retirement benefits) is shown to have positive effects on the 
labor supply, the output of the economy and the capital stock of the economy. Output and the capital stocks 
increase by ‘12’ percent and ‘15’ percent respectively. Hours at work and the average retirement age per 
agent do not show any outstanding changes, however. The social security tax, J , in the reform economy 
with the replacement rate changes, is ‘15.20’ percent on average. 
Then, the distribution of the marginal benefits of retirement is changed; by changing only the formula for 
calculation of the benefits per each year of experience, but keeping the size of the social insurance system 
constant. Changing only the distribution of the replacement rate, that is increasing benefits of getting retired 
at a later period and decreasing contribution of each period in the first 8 periods (corresponding to the age 
of up to 60), increases tendency to work. Thus, decreases the dependency ratio and increases inflows into 
the social security system. Changing the distribution of the replacement rate has negative effect on the 
economic activity of the model economy in question. Both the output and the capital stocks are down by 
‘3.75’ and ‘5.6’ percent respectively. These figures briefly mean that savings are decreased, but the labor 
supply is increased. Decrease in the economic activity is mainly because of dominance of fall in savings 
over the increase in labor supply. 
The third reform is where the minimum age for collection of the retirement benefits is increased to ‘65’. An 
increase in the minimum age for retirement benefits collection, promote more days in the labor force and 
encourages more social security premium payments. It also makes sure agents or the retirees get the 
deserved retirement benefits for less time, after the retirement. Age increase for the retirement benefits 
collection, as demonstrated above, seems to be more effective than the basic replacement rate changes 
implemented in the previous reforms. 
Finally, the researcher discusses applying both the age increase and the benefits calculation formula 
modifications. Simultaneously apply both of the reforms reflects the combined aggregate effect of both of 
these changes to the model economy. This last alternative economy outcome demonstrates substantial 
changes both in the capital stock and the output of the economy. This is because increasing the minimum 
age for the retirement benefit payments is more effective and dominates the other key change in the 
calculation of marginal benefit payments calculation. The model, again, provides a new in the equilibrium, 
since the model leads to a new social security system. 
Overall, in a way, the social security reforms are meant to encourage more time in the labor force and 
therefore more tax payments to the insurance system. And this, in return, helps decrease the social 
security taxes as well as the systematic deficits. Social security taxes in the reform economy with both 
reforms applied (age and benefit formula) decreases to around 13 percent on average. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has employed an overlapping generations (OLG) setup to study the quantitative implications of 
the two key changes of the most recent reform in the Turkish Social Insurance System. The 2008 reform 
basically negatively affects the replacement rate for workers entitled to the pension benefits. After the 
reform, the marginal benefits are decreased in aggregate. Meanwhile, the distribution of the marginal 
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retirement benefits is also changed and the minimum age to begin collecting the old-age pensions is 
elevated to ‘65’ years. 
This chapter shows that after the reforms, pensioners are expected to work for more periods; and hence 
make more savings before their retirement age. Benefits of getting retired at a later period are increased by 
the reforms. Post the reforms; people benefit from the pension system for less time and at a much older-
age. Although hours at work per agent and the average retirement age are not changed much, promoting 
more years at the labor force is proven to have strong positive effects on the economic activity via 
increasing the labor supply, the output level and the capital stock of the economy. 
A critical analysis of the basic modifications to the benefit payments collection formula, demonstrates that; 
the social security tax, J , is on average decreased to ‘15.20’ percent; down from its benchmark value of 
‘17.35’ percent. Benefit payments are also decreased. For instance, the replacement rate for 25 years of 
contribution payment is down from 65 percent to 50 percent. The replacement rate is decreased for an 
average agent and period. In a way, the size of the social security system is decreased along the reforms. 
Alternatively, considering just a change in the distribution of the marginal benefits of retirement, the 
economic activity shows decreases in the output and the capital stock. This, simply means the social 
security tax, J , is constant at ‘17.35’ just as its value in the benchmark economy; but the marginal benefit 
of the initial years is decreased and that of the latter years is increased. The output and the capital stock 
responses to changing only the distribution of the marginal contributions to the replacement rate are both 
negative. 
It should also be noted that, although the distribution of the marginal contributions to the replacement rate 
shows negative effects on the economic activity; the aggregate change in the replacement rate and the 
basic increase in the minimum age requirement for the retirement benefits, together, compensate for this 
decrease and has an even outstanding positive increases in the labor supply, the capital stock and the 
overall output of the economy.  
This model, therefore, demonstrates that the 2008 reform in the Turkish social insurance system have had 
considerable positive effects on the aggregate economic activity and the saving behavior of the 
households, and thus the longer-term higher capital stock in the economy by promoting saving more. Since 
the reform discussed here has just recently been launched, it will for sure take time for reform to be fully 
effective in all aspects. Hence, the reforms are considered to be beneficial for the Turkish economy 
especially in the long run. 
Future studies on the security reforms and extensions of this paper may include differentiation among 
different social security institutions (in particular for the case of Turkey) for agents from varying areas of 
work. That is, basically differentiating between SSK, BAG-KUR and Emekli Sandigi; the three branches of 
the Turkish public social security system. And the effects of the reforms over all these social security 
systems should be examined separately. The new reform in the social security system also aims to cover 
those still without any social security record; including those that previously held the green cards (the-free-
riders). Considering that, then, the effects of including those already funded from the public budget, should 
also be of interest for future studies. 
Meanwhile, this paper, also have few other basic simplifying assumptions like everybody having the same 
minimum age to be entitled to and to get the retirement benefits. Whereas, in reality, agents may actually 
face different age requirements depending on, for instance, the first year of their social security records. 
Differentiating between agents of differing restrictions for retirement benefits might also be useful for the 
medium-run outcomes. As is stated in the reform bulletin (MLSS reform bulletin, 2008), the reform will 
indeed fully take effect, in all aspects, after 2048. 
As was mentioned in the introduction section, the financial market implications of changes in the social 
security systems; such as the fund flows and the long-run implications on the interest rate and liquidity in 
the market was not the researcher’s priority concern here. The author skipped the financial market 
implications or the portfolio flow effects (that are frequently examined in advanced economy cases) and just 
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concentrated on the real macro implications for developing economies cases. This was done, in an effort, 
to limit the focus on the real macro effects of reforms in developing economies in this chapter. Future 
studies could and in fact even should be concerned with the financial market implications as well. 
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